Archive for the ‘IETF’ Category

RFC6797 “HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)” is published

Wednesday, November 21st, 2012

RFC6797 “HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)” is now available.

It’s been a long haul to get to this point, and I thank all the folks who have contributed along the way, i.e. Collin Jackson and Adam Barth who had the original idea [ForceHTTPS] and co-authored the spec, and all the other folks who contributed to its gestation (from the Acknowledgements appendix):

The authors thank Devdatta Akhawe, Michael Barrett, Ben Campbell,
Tobias Gondrom, Paul Hoffman, Murray Kucherawy, Barry Leiba, James
Manger, Alexey Melnikov, Haevard Molland, Yoav Nir, Yngve N.
Pettersen, Laksh Raghavan, Marsh Ray, Julian Reschke, Eric Rescorla,
Tom Ritter, Peter Saint-Andre, Brian Smith, Robert Sparks, Maciej
Stachowiak, Sid Stamm, Andy Steingrubl, Brandon Sterne, Martin
Thomson, Daniel Veditz, and Jan Wrobel, as well as all the websec
working group participants and others for their various reviews and
helpful contributions.

Thanks to Julian Reschke for his elegant rewriting of the effective
request URI text, which he did when incorporating the ERU notion into
the updates to HTTP/1.1 [HTTP1_1-UPD]. Subsequently, the ERU text in
this spec was lifted from Julian’s work in the updated HTTP/1.1
(part 1) specification and adapted to the [RFC2616] ABNF.

See also the Wikipedia HSTS article for various other information about HSTS and deploying it.

=JeffH sez check it out :)

HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) Approved as Proposed Standard RFC

Tuesday, October 2nd, 2012

As I’d noted back in July, the draft HSTS spec was in IETF-wide last call, from which we exited in August with various helpful comments. We applied summore elbow grease to the ol’spec and shipped it to the IESG (Internet Engineering Steering Group) for further inspection, received more good comments, subsequently applied more tweaks and polish, and voila(!), this morning we have this little missive in our email…

[websec] Protocol Action: ‘HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)’ to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec-14.txt)

At this point, the draft HSTS spec will be placed on the RFC Editor’s queue (which is fairly large & diverse) and will emerge in several weeks as an RFC with a proper RFC number and all.

Many thanks to all who’ve contributed, especially to Collin Jackson & Adam Barth for originally inventing this approach (which they dubbed “ForceHTTPS“).


PS: The Wikipedia HSTS entry has a consolidated specification history as well as information regarding implementation and deployment.

Finishing up the HSTS spec — IETF-wide Last Call

Wednesday, July 11th, 2012

We’re in the near-final push here on getting the HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) draft spec to be published as an RFC.

The most recent draft version (revision -11 as of this writing) is here..

And the IESG‘s announcement for IETF-wide Last Call is here..

We’re coming around the last corner and the finish line is in sight!

See also the Wikipedia entry for HSTS — it has info on the spec’s history, applicability, deployment, and implementations.

RFC6265 ‘HTTP State Management Mechanism’ (”cookies”) published

Friday, May 6th, 2011

This is sorta old news at this point, the publication was announced on 27 April 2011. Bil Corry and I wrote about the spec in early March (acknowledging the many contributors) when it was approved as ‘proposed standard’ and en-queued to the RFC Editor, and others have written about it (in detail) now that the RFC is actually published, so I’ll just point to ’em here…

Daniel Stenberg – The cookie RFC 6265 (english)

Stéphane Bortzmeyer – RFC 6265: HTTP State Management Mechanism (french)

Joachim Strömbergson – Cookie-RFCn 6265 (swedish)

It feels good to get that out the door!

RFC6125 “TLS/SSL Server Identity Check” is published

Tuesday, April 5th, 2011

RFC6125TLS/SSL Server Identity Check” (aka “TLS Server ID Check“, “SSL Server ID
“, “TLS/SSL Server ID Check“, “SSL Server ID“) is now available:

Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service
Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Alas, we messed up by not including this “short form” title directly in the spec:

TLS/SSL Server Identity Check

But hopefully people will know what spec is meant if someone uses that short-form title.

I’ve written about the spec and its background before:

of TLS/SSL Server Identity Checking

Although we produced the spec without a formal working group, many people contributed to it one way or another. From the Contributors and Acknowledgments sections:

The following individuals made important contributions to the text of this document: Shumon Huque, RL ‘Bob’ Morgan, and Kurt Zeilenga.

The editors and contributors wish to thank the following individuals for their feedback and suggestions: Bernard Aboba, Richard Barnes, Uri Blumenthal, Nelson Bolyard, Kaspar Brand, Anthony Bryan, Scott Cantor, Wan-Teh Chang, Bil Corry, Dave Cridland, Dave Crocker, Cyrus Daboo, Charles Gardiner, Philip Guenther, Phillip Hallam-Baker, Bruno Harbulot, Wes Hardaker, David Harrington, Paul Hoffman, Love Hornquist Astrand, Henry Hotz, Russ Housley, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Cullen Jennings, Simon Josefsson, Geoff Keating, John Klensin, Scott Lawrence, Matt McCutchen, Alexey Melnikov, Subramanian Moonesamy, Eddy Nigg, Ludwig Nussel, Joe Orton, Tom Petch, Yngve N. Pettersen, Tim Polk, Robert Relyea, Eric Rescorla, Pete Resnick, Martin Rex, Joe Salowey, Stefan Santesson, Jim Schaad, Rob Stradling, Michael Stroeder, Andrew Sullivan, Peter Sylvester, Martin Thomson, Paul Tiemann, Sean Turner, Nicolas Williams, Dan Wing, Dan Winship, and Stefan Winter.

Thanks also to Barry Leiba and Ben Campbell for their reviews on behalf of the Security Directorate and the General Area Review Team, respectively.

The responsible Area Director was Alexey Melnikov.

(i.e. 59 people besides PeterSA and myself (wow))

TLS/SSL Server Identity Check will be RFC6125

Tuesday, March 15th, 2011

As I’ve previously mentioned, I’ve been working on a specification for “TLS/SSL Server Identity Checking” along with Peter Saint-Andre.

We’ve now heard back from the RFC Editor, and we’re in the so-called “AUTH48 state” where we, the spec’s authors/editors, work with the RFC Editor folks to turn the Internet-Draft into a RFC.

At this point we know the RFC number-to-be: 6125.

So, we’re close to getting this thing out the door, whew. :)

‘HTTP State Management Mechanism’ (“cookies”) to Proposed Standard

Monday, March 7th, 2011

There’s been various fundamental issues with “HTTP cookies” for ages, e.g. technically and policy-wise (i.e. privacy). The two extant formal specifications of cookies, IETF RFCs 2109 and 2965, as well as the original informal and incomplete “Netscape cookie spec”, have not been implemented uniformly across browsers and servers. Thus how cookies are actually constructed, parsed, and used in practice has been essentially technical folklore. Anyone wanting to craft a new browser or some other application or tool that needs to consume or send cookie headers had to reverse engineer how the browsers were actually doing it as there wasn’t (until now) an accurate specification an implementer could use for reference. This has led to divergence on edge-cases for cookies within various browsers, servers, and other tools.

We’ve been working with browser, server, and web app folk in an IETF working group, “httpstate“, to rectify this, and the draft spec was recently approved for publication as an IETF RFC at the “Proposed Standard” maturity level. This spec differs from the prior specs in that it specifies how cookies are actually used on the Internet today. Anyone crafting a new client or server can implement the spec and have an interoperable implementation as a result.

This is great in that getting this finally explicitly documented will be a key underlying piece of moving “the Web“, and the wider Internet its built upon, on towards its next stage(s). Hopefully, browsers and servers can now converge their “cookie behaviors” :)

Our more detailed blog post (which includes some history) is here..

‘HTTP State Management Mechanism’ to Proposed Standard

=JeffH sez check it out :)

Web (In)Security: Remediation Efforts – Status and Outlook

Monday, March 7th, 2011

We have a blog post over at my work cohort’s blog, w.r.t. a recent preso we gave, here’s the link…

Web (In)Security: Remediation Efforts – Status and Outlook

Check it out :)

of TLS/SSL Server Identity Checking

Tuesday, February 1st, 2011

[ Update (23-Apr-2011): This spec was published as RFC6125 on 30-Mar-2011. See also this more recent post. ]

Aside from HSTS, which I’ve written about here earlier, I’ve also been working on a specification for “TLS/SSL Server Identity Checking” along with Peter Saint-Andre.

The basic summary is: you have a DNS domain name identifying some application service (aka “a server”) you wish to connect to over TLS/SSL, e.g. “”, and once you do so, how do you really know (and check) that the returned PKIX Certificate contains an identifier(s) that maps to the name of the application service you intended to interact with?

This turns out to be a fairly complex endeavor, and up to the present here, various protocol specs have either specified it on their own, or have referenced another spec that has addressed the problem. One such referenced spec is RFC2830, “Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3): Extension for Transport Layer Security“, which I co-authored. So anyway, I got involved a few years back in trying to concoct a dedicated specification for how to do TLS/SSL server identity checking in an application protocol neutral fashion. Eventually, Peter Saint-Andre and I signed up to buckle down and make the spec a reality. Much of this work occurred during 2010.

The resulting internet-draft, draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check, was approved on 20-Jan-2011 as a Proposed Standard RFC, and will be published as such in the next couple of months. It has this fairly precise but unwieldy title:

Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)

In the spec (which has been referred to as “-tls-server-id-check” in various email discussion threads (e.g. see the list), we provide an appendix of extracts from various current RFCs that specify performing such a check. The hope is that, going forward, emerging specifications can simply reference (i.e. “re-use”), and profile if necessary, the -tls-server-id-check spec. In fact, there’s presently four Internet-Drafts in the RFC-Editor’s work queue that do just that.

=JeffH sez check it out :)

New rev of SIP-SAML profile

Tuesday, November 4th, 2008

There’s a new revision of the SIP-SAML profile spec..

SIP SAML Profile and Binding

The key changes in this revision are that we’re aiming for experimental track (for now) due to a subtle-but-important impedance mismatch with the “SIP Identity” spec (RFC 4474, which we build upon), and we’ve add an additional profile to the spec. This new profile simply specifies SAML assertion conveyance “by value” in the body of SIP message(s) rather than “by reference”.

Note that the overall notion of “SIP Identity” has been in-flux over the last year+. Once that set of issues is (hopefully) resolved, then we can do another SIP-SAML spec on the standards track.

Also, the SIP WG co-chairs have called for Working Group Last Call on this -05 revision.

=JeffH sez getcher comments in!